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Abstract:  
This paper investigates the influence of a firm’s distance from control on its performance, 
using a unique firm level data set on small business ownership, as well as balance sheet 
information. This study fills a gap in the empirical governance literature by investigating 
whether or not there is an expropriation of minority shareholders in small business groups. 
Contrary to what is usually observed for large business groups, results show a positive 
relationship between the separation of control from ownership and firm performance. Results 
also underline that tunneling is used to promote controlling shareholders’ profit stability 
rather than profit maximization in small business groups. 
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1  Introduction 
Recent evidence points out that small business groups (SBG)  are burgeoning  in 
developed countries. A SBG is an ownership structure where a dominant shareholder holds 
several firms through a control chain, and its size is that of a small and medium enterprise 
(SME)
1
At first glance, agency issues should be exacerbated in SBGs given the concentrated 
governance structure of small businesses. Thus, like in large family BGs, the concentration of 
. According to the Banque de France, French firms affiliated to SBGs have doubled 
over the last decade, and represent one third of the SMEs in the country (e.g., Cayssials et al., 
2007; and Nahmias, 2007). Structuring control using a SBG, rather than develop the initial 
business in a standalone firm is a specific growth strategy. This paper explores entrepreneurs’ 
motivations to adopt this strategy. Corporate governance theory suggests that business groups 
(BG) are a device used to increase control without commensurate cash flows. This is done by 
introducing a separation between control rights and cash flow rights. Indeed, concentrated 
control allows the dominant shareholder to act in its own interest, raising concern for the 
expropriation of  minority  shareholders  (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Under the 
expropriation hypothesis, excess control of dominant shareholders has a negative influence on 
firms’ value. Empirical evidence strongly supports this hypothesis for large BGs (see Table 
1). However, grouping SMEs might also be a growth strategy limiting the wealth exposure to 
the business risk of dominant shareholders. Indeed, indirect control of several firms, rather 
than control of a  standalone firm creates a “fractioning of liability”: the  dominant 
shareholder’s wealth exposure to the business risk is divided between group firms. This paper 
investigates whether the rationale to grow the business by building a SBG is to increase 
dominant shareholders  private benefits (expropriation hypothesis) or to limit their  wealth 
exposure to the business risk (immunization hypothesis). 
                                                           
1 SMEs are defined following the recommendation of the EU Commission (6 May 2003) regarding the definition 
of a SME: a SME is a firm which annual turnover is inferior to 50 million Euros.    3 
control may lead to the expropriation of minority shareholders. More specifically, in owner-
manager firms, control concentration does not improve the efficiency of monitoring, whereas 
the entrenchment problem persists (e.g. Bennedsen and Nielsen, 2010).  Despite the 
concentration of control, SMEs’ external investors specificities may lower business owners’ 
propensity to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Given SMEs’ 
informational opacity and the illiquidity of their shares, there are  two types of specific 
external investors in SMEs. Connected minority shareholders, such as family members, are 
the main source of a SME’s external equity financing. In order to broaden financial resources, 
social connections based on trust, are thus  crucial for SMEs (e.g.,Vos et al., 2007). The 
presence of connected minority shareholders therefore diminishes the incentives to extract 
private benefits at their expense. Small business owners do not wish to be deprived from this 
source of external financing in the future.  In addition,  SMEs might also be financed by 
informed minority shareholders, such as venture capitalists. Their monitoring capacities limit 
the dominant shareholder’s ability to extract private benefits. It is therefore possible to cast 
doubt on the relevance of the hypothesis according to which grouping small businesses allows 
to increase the private benefits of control.  
Furthermore, small business owners’ wealth under diversification creates an incentive to 
reduce their wealth  exposure to the business risk.  Since  an important proportion of 
entrepreneurs’ wealth is vested into the business, their risk exposure is higher than that of 
shareholders  investing their wealth in public securities  (e.g.,  Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2002). This situation creates distortions in their risk incentives: they are sensitive 
to the business idiosyncratic risk.  Small businesses’  owners might thus  favor strategies 
reducing their wealth exposure to the firm’s business risk. Choosing to growth via a SBG 
allows the dominant shareholder to immunize part of his wealth. Indeed, the fact that BGs’ 
firms have a limited liability between them reduces entrepreneurs’ losses in case of a group’s   4 
firm  default. SBGs’  owners  only loose control on the assets  of the  defaulting  firm, 
maintaining control over the  assets of the  other group’s firms, which allow pursuing 
production.  Moreover, internal transfers between group’s  firms allow the  controlling 
shareholder to affect group firms’ risk patterns. The dominant shareholder can use internal 
transfers in order to smooth the revenue of firms where its stakes are higher. The under 
diversification of small business owners might therefore explains why they opt to growth their 
businesses using a SBG. On the one hand, the “fractioning of liability”, permits to limit the 
entrepreneur’s losses in case of a group’s firm default. On the other hand, it enables dominant 
shareholder to transfer risk toward firms where its stakes are lower, which would imply a shift 
from value expropriation toward risk expropriation of minority shareholders.  
This study explores empirically two hypotheses: the expropriation and the immunization 
hypothesis. It uses a unique data set which exhaustively lists ownership links between French 
corporations. More than 15 000 SBGs are identified according to the criterion of majority 
control: a BG corresponds to a chain of majority control relationships. The database contains 
information on the direct and indirect cash-flow rights of each firm in other firms, which 
allow computing the cash flow rights of controlling firms and traditional variables of excess 
control. The database also provides information on firms’ position in the control chain. This 
permits to distinguish controlling from controlled firms, and assess the relative position of the 
firm according to its position in the control chain and the number of levels in the control 
chain.  Therefore, this paper broaden the traditional approach, which  focus on controlling 
shareholders ‘excess control, by exploring the influence of firms’ distance from control on 
their performance. Complete accounting information is available for half of these SBGs for 
the period between 1999 and 2007.  
This paper explores the motivations to growth using a SBG rather than a standalone firm, 
by studying the link between SMEs’ governance and performance. This study first assesses   5 
the accuracy of the expropriation hypothesis in SBGs. Traditionally  studies on this issue 
observe the influence of dominant shareholders’ excess control on firms’ performance. This 
study performs this test, but also uses the firm’s position in the control chain to observe how 
firms’ distance from control influence their performance. If the expropriation hypothesis is 
verified, firms that are more distant from control position should underperform. Next, the 
study investigates related party transactions within SBGs, by assessing the influence of the 
firm’s distance from control on its performance sensitivity to industry and group shocks. This 
permits  to gauge whether wealth  is transferred from firms where dominant shareholders 
stakes are low toward firms where their stakes are high, which would provide support to the 
expropriation hypothesis. However, if  internal transfers favor  the  lowering of the  firm’s 
sensitivity to shocks  when the firm is  closer from control position,  this is interpreted as 
support for the immunization hypothesis.  Furthermore,  the  influence of the business 
environment on value transfers between group firms is captured. This is done in order to test 
whether resources transfer out of controlled firms toward controlling firms is related to the 
will to maintain artificially controlling firms’ performance. To explore this issue Bertrand et 
al. (2002) empirical setting is extended in order to estimate the global effect of a firm’s 
distance from control on its performance, controlling for the type of shock. The use of internal 
transfers to prevent controlling firms’ performance from unfavorable shocks is interpreted as 
support for both the immunization and expropriation hypotheses.  Indeed, such transfers 
reduce dominant shareholders wealth exposure to the business risk, by transferring it to 
minority shareholders. 
Results confirm  that  SBGs  are primarily built for dominant shareholders’ wealth 
immunization rather than for minority shareholders’ expropriation objectives. The data shows 
a positive relationship between distance from control and firms’ performances. Furthermore, 
related party transactions are influenced by  the  firm’s  business environment and group   6 
performance. Intra group transfers foster controlled firms’ development  when both are 
favorable; however, when shocks are unfavorable, related party transactions preserve 
controlling firms’ performance. Results support the idea that grouping small businesses favors 
the wealth stability of dominant  shareholders:  the sensitivity to exogenous shocks of 
controlling firms is 68% lower that the one of controlled firms. 
This paper corroborates that governance issues are different in SBGs compare to large 
BGs.  The  expropriation  hypothesis,  according to which  structuring control in a BG is a 
growth strategy permitting to increase capital while conserving the private benefits of control, 
is not verified in SBGs. Indeed, results show that SBG affiliation enhances controlled firms 
performance. One explanation to this observation relates to the specificity of small businesses 
minority shareholder that limits the possibilities for SMEs’ owners to extract private benefits. 
Thus, in the case of small businesses,  specific governance mechanisms related to close 
connections or/and higher monitoring abilities  might  offset the governance inefficiencies 
related to informational opacity and concentrated control. The immunization hypothesis 
according to which structuring control in a BG is a growth strategy allowing controlling 
shareholders to reduce their wealth exposure to the business risk is verified. Moreover, results 
point out that when the business environment is unfavorable resources are transferred out of 
controlled firms in order to support controlling firms’ performance. Thus, the will to 
immunize controlling shareholders’ wealth does in certain conditions engender an 
expropriation of minority shareholders. Overall, results point out that dominant shareholders 
trade performance against reduced risk with minority shareholders in SBGs. If SBGs minority 
shareholders have the ability to diversify risk then building a SBG seems an efficient growth 
strategy. In this case the inefficiencies related to private benefits extraction are limited and the 
benefits of a reduction of business owners’ risk exposure led to higher growth through a 
diminution of their cost of capital and thus an increase of their investment.    7 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 summarizes the literature and develops the 
hypothesis. Section 3 presents the data and the methodology. Section 4 discusses the results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2  Theory and hypothesis 
The hypothesis of expropriation of minority shareholders in business groups have been 
empirically studied following two approaches. A majority of papers focus on the relationship 
between excess control and firm performance, while other papers investigate the direction of 
related party transactions between controlling and controlled firms.  
2.1  Excess control and firms’ performance 
In business groups, a  firm‘s  performance is driven by two opposite incentive 
mechanisms: a positive effect resulting from the dominant shareholder’s cash flow rights and 
a negative effect related to its control rights. The negative effect is related to the fact that 
“large shareholders may represent their own interest, which need not coincide with the 
interests of other investors” (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p758). Securing control rights 
prevents dominant shareholders  from losing control over the firm, which may  lead to 
entrenched behavior. In addition, business owners might use their control rights in order to 
extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Hence, a firm’s performance 
is influenced by the controlling shareholder’s separation between control rights and cash flow 
rights  within the firm.  In large business groups,  mainly in emerging countries, empirical 
results are consistent with  the expropriation of minority shareholders  hypothesis. Results 
show that excess control is detrimental for firm value and that resources are diverted from 
controlled firms toward controlling firms (see Table 1). Even so, the evidence on the agency 
cost of  business groups in developed countries remains scarce. And, there is to our 
knowledge, no study of this topic for SBGS.   8 
[Insert table 1 here] 
Even if a majority of empirical studies verify the existence of a negative relationship 
between the excess control of dominant shareholders and the firm’s value, this idea can be 
challenged.  In fact, in the case of new firms, Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) argue that 
controlling shareholders create dynamically new firms when the original firm starts to decline. 
Such a strategy would drive controlling firms’ underperformance relative to controlled firms. 
In the case of SMEs, minority shareholders’ specificity could prevent dominant shareholders 
from extracting private benefits. The presence of connected minority shareholders diminishes 
the owner’s incentives to extract private benefits. While the presence of informed minority 
shareholders, with monitoring abilities,  such as venture capitalists,  limits  a  dominant 
shareholder’s ability to extract private benefits. Therefore, the specificity of SMEs minority 
shareholders make it difficult to extract private benefits at their expense, casting doubts on the 
validity of minority shareholders expropriation in SBGs.  
2.2  Related party transactions: propping or tunneling? 
In business groups, it is possible to transfer assets and benefits through related party 
transactions between firms. To observe the direction of related party transactions Bertrand et 
al. (2002) assess firm performance reaction to shocks to its industry and to other group firms’ 
performance. The literature focuses on the direction of related party transactions. Tunneling
2
                                                           
2  Johnson  et al. (2000), distinguish between two types of tunneling. First, a controlling shareholder might 
transfer resources in his own interest through internal transfers: self dealing transactions. Secondly, controlling 
shareholder can increase his control without transferring any assets through dilutive share issues; this paper only 
focuses on the first type of tunneling. 
 
describes assets and benefits transfers from firms where the dominant shareholder’s stakes are 
low, to  firms where its  stakes are high (e.g., Johnson et al, 2000).  Whereas, propping 
describes a transfer from higher-level firms to lower-level firms in the control chain, which is 
intended to bail out the receiving firm from bankruptcy (e.g., Friedman et al. 2003). Bertrand   9 
et al. (2002) consider the case of Indian business groups, their results uphold that tunneling is 
an  issue in large business groups, providing support for the expropriation hypothesis. 
However, recent evidence points out that propping and tunneling are intermingled issues. 
Dow and McGuire (2009) observe profit tunneling of more weakly affiliated Keireitsu firms 
during strong economic times, but propping in those firms during recession. Such evidence 
can be related to the mutual insurance effect of business groups. Affiliated firms are, on 
average, less risky than independent firms, because internal transfers allow to smooth revenue 
across group firms (Khanna and Yafeh, 2005).  
But, an entrepreneur’s wealth under diversification affects its risk incentives, therefore 
building SBGs might be a growth strategy limiting the dominant shareholder’s risk exposure. 
As a matter of fact, commercial law recognizes the principle of a controlling firm’s limited 
liability in case of bankruptcy of an affiliated firm
3
                                                           
3  French commercial law is quite protective of controlling companies as there are only three restrictive 
exceptions to this principle (French commercial code: C.COM art L.621-2; L.651-1 and L.651-1).  
. Consequently, indirect control of several 
firms, rather than control of a standalone firm, creates a “fractioning of liability”: the control 
risk of dominant shareholders is divided between group firms. This allows small business 
owners to secure assets in one firm, and concentrate production risk in another group firm. If 
a lower-level group’ firm goes bankrupt, entrepreneurs still control the assets necessary to 
pursue production.  Moreover, related party transactions allow to tunnel resources out of 
controlled firms in order to support the controlling firm’s performance, when the business 
environment is unfavorable. If grouping SMEs is a growth strategy promoting the dominant 
shareholder’s  wealth stability, distance from control  will increase a  firm’s performance 
sensitivity to shocks. Overall, the patterns of propping and tunneling should be inverted in 
SBGs compare to large BGs.   10 
3  Data and methodology 
SBGs are identified using a large database
4 provided by Coface Services, which lists 
1.900.000 direct and indirect ownership links between French corporations. Sample firms are 
either directly or indirectly controlled at a majority
5 by a firm or group’s controlling firms. 
They belong to business groups with total aggregated turnover lower than 50 million Euros. 
15 877 SBGs are identified
6
3.1  Distance from control variables 
. SBGs are composed, on average, of 3 firms and the chain of 
control has two levels. Overall, the final sample contains 17 152 firms, of which 13 657 are 
controlled and 3 495 are controlling firms. Accounting information over the period 1999 to 
2007 is available for all firms. It comes from the Diane database, supplied by Coface Services 
and Bureau Van Dijk. In Appendix D variables used in this study are summarized. 
The synopsis of the literature points out two main types of variables used to characterize 
the firm’s control. The excess of control right over cash flow rights is the more commonly 
used variable. However, broader measures of the firm’s distance from control- such as group 
affiliation, director/family ownership of the controlling firm, vertical or horizontal structure of 
the group - are also used. The detailed information contained in the database allows the use of 
both types of variables in order to verify if results are affected or not by variables choice. 
Particularly, the database enables to identify the group’s controlling firms and included them 
because SBGs do not consolidate their account.  
Excess control variables capture the  dominant shareholder’s  separation between 
ownership and control in a firm. To measure excess control, this study uses two variables. The 
first variable, the controlling firm’s ownership (CF) in a firm, increases as the controlling 
                                                           
4 Details on this database are presented in appendix B. 
5 The methodology adopted to identify business groups in the database is developed in appendix C. 
6  Firms with a turnover lower than 750 000€ are excluded (because of the poor reliability of micro firms 
accounting data) and only observations for which there is at least two consecutive years of accounting 
information are kept.   11 
firm’s excess control diminishes. Then there is the control ratio: the ratio of controlling 
firms’ ownership stakes on their control, where control is the weakest direct ownership stake 
in the chain of control (e.g., Classens et al.  2000)
7
Alternatively,  position variables  indicate the  firm’s  vertical  position in the control 
chain. That is, position equals 1 when the firm is the controlling firm, 2 when the firm is 
directly controlled and so on. Building on this variable several variables indicating the firm’s 
distance from control are created. First, the controlling variable is equal to 1 if the firm is the 
controlling firm and 0 otherwise. Secondly, the ultimately controlled variable takes value 1 if 
the firm is the ultimate controlled firm and 0 otherwise. Finally, the relative position variable 
indicates the position of the firm relative to the number of vertical levels in the control chain: 
it is the ratio of the number of levels in the control chain on the firm’s position. An increase in 
relative position indicates that firms are closer to control position. Position variables are a 
broader approach than excess control variables. On the one hand, they indicate the likelihood 
that separation between control and ownership might be introduced. Firms distant from the 
controlling firm are more prone to experience a significant separation between control and 
ownership. On the other hand, position variables capture a firm’s control value. Even if there 
is a separation between control and ownership, it may not be the dominant shareholder’s 
interest to hurt firms high in the control chain.  Because, losing control over these firms 
implies losing control over the firms lower in the control chain. 
. The difference between these two 
variables relates to the continuity of control. Indeed, the ownership variable assumes that 
control is a discrete variable, whereas the control ratio considers that control is a continuous 
variable. 
Descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 underline that in the sample, controlling firms’ 
ownership concentration in controlled firms is  high (76%)  compare to the one in large 
                                                           
7 In appendix D an example illustrates how these two variables are computed.   12 
business groups. In addition, the average separation between control and ownership in sample 
firms is rather low. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
3.2  Methodology 
Three  empirical settings exploring the link between a  firm’s  performances and its 
distance from control  are  used  in order to test the hypotheses of expropriation and 
immunization. Estimations include all sample firms. 





t i n n i t i Controls CS Perf ,
2
, , 1 , ε β β α + + + = ∑
=
(1) 
The dependent variable is either the firm’s return on asset (ROA) or the return on equity 
(ROE) in year t. The ROA is used to proxy for the firm’s economic performance. Indeed, the 
ROA measure is not influenced by firms’ financial and amortization policies. In this case, the 
ROA fully reflects the firm’s operating performance. The ROE measures the actual return for 
shareholders; it is an indicator of the firm’s financial performance. The analysis focuses on 
the coefficients in front of firms’ distance from control ( i CS ). If the expropriation hypothesis 
is verified, then distance from control
8
                                                           
8 The control ratio and ultimately controlled variables have higher values when the firm’s distance from control 
is higher, whereas the ownership, controlling and relative position variables have lower values the distance from 
control increases. Therefore, is the expropriation hypothesis is verified one should observe a positive coefficient 
on ownership, controlling and relative position variables and a negative coefficient on the control ratio and 
ultimately controlled variable. 
 should have a negative influence on firm performance. 
Several control variables, which also influence firm performance, are included. The firm’s 
industry controls for  the  firm’s  performance opportunities such as the importance of 
economies of scale in the industry where the firm operates, as well as characteristics of the   13 
market including its size and the intensity of competition. The equation also includes controls 
variables for the firm’s age and size. In addition, the firm’s leverage and sales growth control 
for  the  firm’s  financial structure and growth opportunities. Finally, year dummies are 
introduced to control for the business cycle impact.  
The second objective is to assess the direction of related party transaction using the 
firm’s performance sensitivity to shocks. Equation 2 is estimated to investigate whether a 




t i n n k t i i k t i t i Controls ROAf CS ROAf ROA ,
3
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(2) 
Shocks, at the industry level, are measured using the industry adjusted performance 




























, where j≠i and k is one of the 60 industries. 
The interaction term between distance from control variables and industry adjusted 
performance ( i k t i CS ROAf * , , ) assess  differences in a  firm’s  sensitivity to industry shocks 
explained by the firm’s distance from control. According to Bertrand et al. (2002), if value is 
transferred out of the firm, then its performance sensitivity to exogenous shocks is lower. If 
the expropriation hypothesis is verified,  distance from control should diminish a  firm’s 
                                                           
9 To compute the industry adjusted performance the official industry classification into 60 industries is used. 
Moreover, the sample used to compute the industry adjusted performance also includes a sub sample of 
independent firms. Finally, the firm is excluded when computing the industry adjusted performance; indeed a 
mechanical correlation is introduced when the firm’s performance is estimated and also determines an 
explicative variable.  
   14 
sensitivity to shocks. But, if the immunization hypothesis is verified distance from control 
should increase a firm’s performance sensitivity to shocks. Control variables are the same as 
equation (1), except that industry dummies are excluded, because this would be redundant 
with the adjusted performance measure. 
Equation 3 is estimated to capture the relationship between a firm’s distance from 
control and firm performance sensitivity to shocks to the group’s performance.  
) 3 ( * ,
4
, , , , 3 , , 2 , , 1 , t i
N
n
t i n n k t i g t i g t i t i Controls ROAf ROAg ROAg CS ROA ε β β β β α + + + + + = ∑
=
 
Shocks to the group performance are captured using group firms’ average industry adjusted 
performance, excluding firm i ( g t i ROAg , , ), as follows: 
1










g t i Nbfirms
ROAf
ROAg , where j≠i and g indicates the business group. To properly estimate 
predicted group performance, complete accounting information is required for all group firms, 
which restricts the sample.  
The interaction term between the  firm’s  distance from control and  group shocks 
( g t i ROAg CS , , * )  assess differences in the  firm’s performance  sensitivity to group 
performance, resulting from its  distance from control. The firm’s industry adjusted 
performance is maintained in the model specification in order to avoid overlapping in the case 
where two or more group firms belong to the same industry.  
The third objective is to explore whether the flow of resources between group firms 
depends on the type of shocks (favorable or unfavorable), in order to test whether internal 
transfers are used to immunize the controlling shareholder’s wealth. This is done by observing 
the global effect of a firm’s distance from control on its performance. The firm’s distance   15 
from control is introduced as an independent variable in equations 2 and 3. The effect of a 
firm’s distance from control on the firm’s performance, controlling for the type of shocks 
is: ) / ( * 2 1 g f ROA
ucture ControlStr
ROA
β β + =
∆
∆
, where  1 β   is the coefficient in front of the 
firm’s distance from control variable, and  2 β  is the coefficient in front of the interaction term 
between control structure and industry adjusted or group performance.  This allows the 
computing of industry adjusted and group performance thresholds for which distance from 
control has a positive influence on firms’  performance. This setting helps to determine 
whether the issues of propping and tunneling are influenced by the business environment. If 
tunneling occurs when the business environment is unfavorable then this provides support 
both to the immunization and the expropriation hypotheses. 
4   Results 
This section reports results on the influence of the firm’s distance from control on the 
firm’s performance (4.1), and on the firm’s sensitivity to industry and group shocks (4.2). 
4.1  The impact of distance from control on firm’s individual performance  
Table 3 reports results of the influence of a firm’s distance from control on the firm’s 
ROA. Columns 1 and 2 indicate that controlling firms’ cash flow rights have a negative 
influence on their  economic performance. On the contrary, the relationship between the 
separation of control from ownership and the firm’s ROA is positive (Columns 3 and 4). The 
sign on the coefficients for the position variables confirms these results. Controlling firms 
have an inferior economic performance, whereas ultimately controlled firms overperform 
other firms (Columns 5 to 10). The influence of a  firm’s  distance from control on  its 
performances is economically important compared to the other explicative variables.  
[Insert Table 3 here]   16 
Table 4 indicates that using average values over the period provides similar 
estimations. Thus, results are not driven by the volatility of small businesses’ accounting data. 
Moreover, the coefficients of year dummies are statistically significant, but their economic 
significance is really low: the sample is not driven by the business cycle.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Estimations of the firms ROE, displayed in Columns 1 to 5 Table 5, confirm that firms 
closer to control positions have, on average, an inferior performance. In order to determine 
whether expropriation of minority shareholders occurs though intra-group loans or asset 
transfers, the firm’s ROA is introduced as a control variable. In this setting, the controlling 
firm’s cash flow rights positively influence the firm’s financial performance (Column 6). 
Moreover, ultimately controlled firms have, on average, an inferior economic performance 
(Column 9), and the relative position variable positively  influences  firm  financial 
performance (Column 10). These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders. 
However, the separation between control and ownership has a positive influence on a firm’s 
financial performance, which contradicts previous results (column 7). Finally, the relationship 
between the controlling status of firms and their ROE, controlling for firms’ ROA is 
insignificant (column 8). These results contradict the previous findings, therefore evidence on 
the expropriation of minority shareholders through financial operations and/or asset transfers 
is limited. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
  The evidence reported in this section shows that distance from control has a positive 
influence  on a firm’s  performance. Results do not support  the hypothesis  that minority 
shareholders’ expropriation is an issue in SBGs.   17 
4.2  Related party transactions in SBGs 
In Table 6, results clearly underline that ownership concentration and closeness to 
control position reduce a firm’s sensitivity to industry shocks (Column 1 and 5). Controlling 
firms are, on average, 68% less sensitive to industry shocks than non controlling firms 
(Column 3). Inversely, excess control increases a firm’s performance sensitivity to industry 
shocks (Column 2). Column 4 shows that ultimately controlled firms are significantly more 
sensitive to industry shocks. Results differ from the ones obtained by Bertrand et al. (2002). 
They observe that controlled firms are, on average, less sensitive to industry shocks. Their 
interpretation is that a firm’s performance sensitivity to exogenous shocks is lower when 
value is transferred out from the firm. Following their interpretation, results indicate that in 
SBGs, resources flow from controlling firms toward controlled firms.  
Results on the firms’ sensitivity to group shocks, displayed in Table 6, sustain that 
controlling firms are less sensitive to shocks, contrary to ultimately controlled firms (Column 
8 and 9). These results are confirmed in Column 10, which indicates that firms closer to 
control positions  have a reduced sensitivity to group shocks.  In addition,  the  separation 
between control and ownership increases a firm’s performance sensitivity to group shocks 
(Column 2). Finally, Column 1 indicates that the cash flow rights of the controlling firm 
reduce a firm’s performance sensitivity to the group’s performance.  
[Insert Table 6 here]  
Overall,  Table 6 indicates that firms closer to control positions  have a lower 
performance sensitivity, both to industry and group shocks. The interpretation of this result is 
twofold. On the one hand, this indicates that value is transferred out of controlling firms 
toward controlled firms, which led to the rejection of the expropriation of minority 
shareholders in SBGs. On the other hand, controlling firms’ performance reduced sensitivity   18 
to shocks might point out that related party transactions are used to limit the wealth exposure 
of dominant shareholders to exogenous shocks, supporting the immunization hypothesis. In 
order to explore more in depth this issue, in Table 7 the firm’s distance from control effect on 
performance is estimated, controlling for industry and group shocks. 
In Table 7, Column 1 reports that the relationship between the  controlling firms’ 
ownership and the firms’ economic performance depends on the type of shocks. When a 
firm’s  industry-adjusted performance ( k t i ROAf , , )  is lower than 6,31%
10
[Insert Table 7 here] 
,  ownership 
concentration has a positive influence on the firm’s economic performance. However, when 
firms have good levels of industry-adjusted performance (higher than 6,31%), a negative 
relationship is observed. Similar results are found regarding firm performance sensitivity to 
group shocks, with a threshold of 7, 63% (see Column 6).Likewise, controlling firms over 
perform other group firms when their industry adjusted performance and group performance 
are below 5% and 3.5%, respectively (Column 3 and 8). The separation between control and 
cash flow rights has no significant influence on the firm’s performance global sensitivity to 
shocks (Column 2 and 7).  Lastly,  the  firm’s  distance from control  is detrimental to its 
performance when shocks are unfavorable, whereas favorable shocks influence  positively 
their performance (Column 4, 5, 9 and 10). 
By and large, results in Table 7 indicate that a firm’s distance from control influence on 
its performance is conditioned by the shock the firm undergoes. When shocks are favorable, 
resources are transferred from controlling firms toward controlled firms. When they are 
                                                           
10 In order to compute this threshold the following formula is used:  
2
1
2 1 ) / ( 0 ) / ( *
β
β
β β − = ⇔ = + =
∆
∆
g f ROA g f ROA
ucture ControlStr
ROA ,where  1 β  is the coefficient in front of the control 
structure variable, and  2 β   is the coefficient in front of the interaction term between control structure and 
industry adjusted or group performance
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unfavorable  however,  controlling firms tunnel resources out of controlled firms, which 
artificially improve their performance. These results are consistent with the immunization 
hypothesis and indicate that in SBGs minority shareholders expropriation is related to 
increase risk rather than value expropriation. 
5  Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper investigates the rationale that leads entrepreneurs to structure their control in 
SBGs, rather than to develop their original business in a standalone firm. Firstly, this paper 
tests whether distance from control of firms influences  their  economic and financial 
performance. Results provide evidence against the hypothesis that minority shareholders are 
expropriated in SBGs: controlled firms over perform controlling firms. This over performance 
is more pronounced however, when one considers the firm’s economic performance over their 
financial performance. In this case, minority shareholders’ interests are hurt via specific 
financial and asset sales policies. Secondly, this paper explores how firms distance from 
control influence their performance sensitivity to exogenous shocks. Results show that value 
transfers are not aimed at increasing the controlling shareholder’s private benefits of control, 
but rather at limiting its control risk. Indeed, firms higher in the control chain tend to tunnel 
resources out, expropriating value from minority shareholders when the business environment 
is unfavorable. Thus, tunneling in small business groups arises when controlling firms 
undergo negative shocks and use internal transfers to artificially maintain their level of 
performance. Nevertheless, when the business environment is good, controlling firms transfer 
resources toward controlled firms in order to support their development.  
On  the whole, results point out that the rationale to structure control via a SBG is 
different from what is observed for large business groups. Grouping SMEs certainly appears 
to be a specific growth strategy which limits controlling shareholders’ risk exposure rather   20 
than one that maximizes the extraction of private benefits. From a managerial point of view, 
results underline that a  firm’s  distance from control influences its speed of transition in 
performance classes close to distress. This indicates that group control structure has to be 
taken into account when modeling  a  firm’s  credit risk. To derive political economy 
implications from these results, future research should address the question of the efficiency 
of this growth strategy, in comparison with internal growth in a standalone firm. Structuring 
control in a SBG reduces  the  controlling shareholder’s wealth  exposure to the business 




Appendix A: An example of a business group identified in the initial database 
 
Figure A1: An example of ownership links between firms 
A 
C  B 
E  D 
F 
70% 
60%  30% 
40% 
90% 
X%  Direct ownership   21 
In the ownership structure, represented in figure A1: firm A has an ownership stake of 
90%*60% = 48% in firm D. However, A controls majoritarily
11
Appendix B: The database on ownership links from Coface Services 
 firm C that in turn controls 
majoritarily firms D, thus A controls firm D. Firm F and E are considered independent firms 
because  none of them are majoritarly controlled by another firm or majoritarily control 
another firm. 
In the database, each firm is uniquely identified according to its official fiscal identity number 
(SIREN). For each ownership link, the database provides two SIREN: one for the controlling 
firm and the other for the controlled firm.  
Level (l): indicates the length of the control chain between the two firms. This variable is 
equal to 1 if the controlling firm owns directly the controlled firm. Values larger than 1 
correspond to indirect ownership through a vertical chain of holdings of length l.  
Ownership (o): is the real holding of the controlling firm in the controlled firm at level l. For 
level=1, the ownership variable defines the direct ownership matrix (D), that lists direct 
ownership across firms. For level>1, the ownership variable defines the indirect ownership 
matrix (I) at level l. Indirect holdings are the product of direct ownership along the control 
chain.  
Number of links (n): is the number of firms, all level confounded, that have an ownership 
stake into the firm.  
The ownership structure illustrated in figure 1 is filled in the database as showed in table B1: 
 
                                                           
11 The term majoritarily is used to describe the fact that a firm controls another firms with the majority (>50%) 
of the controlled firm’s shares.   22 
Controlled firm 
Table B1: Initial database structure 
Controlling firm  Level  Number of links  Ownership 
B  A  1  1  70% 
C  A  1  2  90% 
D  A  2  3  48% 
E  A  2  2  21% 
E  B  1  2  30% 
D  C  1  3  60% 
C  F  1  2  40% 
D  F  2  3  20% 
 
Appendix C: Identification procedure of business groups according to the criteria of 
effective majority control in the database. 
The group identification procedure uses the criterion of majority control: a business 
group corresponds to a chain of majority control relationships. The majoritisation rule (e.g., 
Chapelle and Szafarz, 2005) implies a dichotomization of ownership to find majority control: 
whenever the shareholder’s ownership stake is higher than 50% it is assumed that control is 
total. In turn other shareholders are assumed to have no effective control. This criterion seems 
better adapted for this study. Indeed, the sample concerns privately held firms where 
ownership is often highly concentrated, yet this threshold avoids counter intuitive findings of 
two controlling firms.  
Firstly, in order to identify the control chains and establish if control is effective at 
each chain’s link the ultimate holding level for each controlled firms is identified. A variable 
N is created, which indicates the higher holding level for each of the controlled firms in the 
initial database. The highest level of holding found in the database is 17. Contrary to the level 
variable that characterized the relation of a controlled firm with a controlling firm, the N 
variable is unique per controlled firm and indicates the higher level at which this firm is held.    23 
Secondly, a binary variable indicates whether a firm undergoes direct effective control 
from the firm holding it directly. The majoritization rule is applied using the ownership (o) 
variable when level=1 to obtain the effective control (ec) variable: this variable takes value 1 
if direct ownership of the firm is higher than 50% and 0 else.  
Thirdly, the effective control level (S) is the highest level where the firm is effectively 
controlled all along the chain of control. From firm at level S to firm at level 0 the control 
variable is equal to 1 at each level. In order to identify the effective control level of firms in 
the database we start from the lowest level of control and go up along the control chain in 
order to observe if there is a control rupture. At the level at which this occurs it returns the 
value of S.  
Fourthly, the controlling firm (ActS) at level S is identified. When N is greater than 2 a 
N steps procedure is required. We first identify whether the firm is effectively controlled at 
level 1, and then if the controlling firm at level 1 (Act1) is effectively controlled and so on 
using the effective control variable (c) that returns the direct ownership between two firms. 
Those transformations allowed modifying the structure of the database as the observations are 
the controlled firms and not every couple of controlled/controlling firm as illustrated in Table 
C 1. Next, the table reports that vertical control chains are the observations and the variables 
indicate the chain of control. Something not reported in the example bellow  is the fact that 
the database also contains the information on direct ownership between firms at each level 
DS. 
Firm 
Table C 1: Identification of the vertical chains of control 
N  S  ActN1  ActN2  ActNi  ActN17  Ultimate controlling firms 
B  1  1  A  .  .  .  A 
C  1  1  A  .  .  .  A 
D  2  2  C  A  .  .  A 
E  2  0  .  .  .  .  .   24 
Finally, to identify groups a last transformation is needed. The aim of this 
transformation consists of making the business groups the observations instead of the vertical 
chains of control. Each of the controlled firms are indexed both by their level of control (l) 
and the horizontal branches to which they belong to (b). This also allows obtaining the 
following group level variables. The Level indicates the length of the vertical control chain in 
the business group. Nbfirms is a variable indicating the number of firms in the business group 
including the controlling firm. Branches provides information regarding the geometry of the 
group by indicating the number of horizontal chain in the business group. If this variable is 
equal to one then the BG is a vertical chain of control, whereas if it is more than 1 then the 
BG a mix  between horizontal and vertical control chain as illustrated in the example of 
business group develop here.  
Ultimately 
controlled firm 
Table C.2: Identification of business groups  
Act11  Act12  Level  NBfirms  Branches  Controlling 
firm 
Group 
D  C  D  2  4  2  A  1 
E        .  .  .  0 
 
Appendix D: Variables description 
Variable Example  Definition
Control ratio
A:. ; B: 0,7/0,7 = 1; C:0,9/0,9=1; D:
0,9*0,6/0,6 =0,9 ;  E:.; F:. 
Ratio of the controlling firm's ownership stakes and its control,
according to the weakest link method.
Controlling  A: 1; B: 0 ; C:0; D:0;E:.; F. Equal1 if the firm is the controlling firm, and 0 otherwise.
Ultimately controlled A:0; B:1; C:0; D:1; E:.; F:.
Takes value 1 if the firm is the ultimate controlled firm,and 0
otherwise. 
Relative position A: 3/3 = 1; B: 2/3 C: 2/3; D=1/3; E: ., F:.;  
Indicates the position of the firm relative to the level number in the
control pyramid: it is the ratio of the number of levels in the pyramid










Table D1: Distance from control variables 
   25 
The example column illustrates how those variables were computed for the business group 





Average performance of firms belonging to the same industry, using
a industry 60 classification, weighted by firms' size (excluding firm
i)
Group
RoA g ( group 
performance)









Return on asset computed as the ration of earnings before tax,
interest and depreciation (EBITDA) on firm total assets.
Financial ROE




Table D3 : Explained variables 
 
Variable Formula Definition
Dummy variables refering to the belonging of the firm to one industry in a
15 industry classification (very close to NACE classiciation). 
Ratio of firm financial debt over total assets.




Those variable equal 1 when the accounting information is from the
year in question, and 0 else.
Age  Log of the number of years since the firm’s creation. 
Leverage 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1: Synopsis of the empirical literature 
Paper Sample Method Control variable Explained variable Result: expropriation of minority 
shareholders
Classens et al. 
(2002)
Publicly traded firms in East Asia 
(1996). Influence of firm's control structure on its value
Spread between control rights and ownership of controlling 
shareholder Firm performance(ROA, Tobin'Q) YES
Joh (2003)
Korean public and large private 
firms (1993-1997). Influence of firm's control structure on its value Disparity between control rights and ownership rights.   Firm performance (Profitability) YES
Faccio et al. 
(2001)
European and Asian business 
groups (1997-2000) Influence of firm's control structure on its value Excess control Dividends rate YES, lower effect in Europe than in Asia
Bae et al. (2002) Korean Chaebol (1981-1993) Influence of firm's control structure on its value
Bidder category according to the shares of the controlling 
shareholder
Market reaction to acquisition events, event study of 
abnormal returns YES
Boubaker (2007)
Large publicly traded French firms 
(2000) Influence of firm's control structure on its value Excess control Firm performance YES
Lins (2003)
Large firms from 18 emerging 
countries (1995). Influence of firm's control structure on its value Excess control Firm performance YES
Gao and Kling 
(2007) Listed Chinese firms (1998-2002). Influence of firm's control structure on its value Belonging to a business group
Difference between account receivable and account 
payable YES
Bertrand et al 2002
Indian business groups (1989-
1999). Tunneling
Group and director equity interaction with exogenous shocks 
and grop shock Firm performance
Less sensitivity to external shocks and group 
shoks (Tunneling)
Dow and McGuire 
(2009) Japanese Keireitsu (1987-2001) Propping and Tunneling
IGJ specific methodology to assign affliation strength and 
differentiating between three periods  Performance
Tunneling during strong economic times, 
and  propping during recession.
Ferris et al. (2003) Korean Chaebols (1990-1995) Propping and Tunneling  Group affiliation  Firm excess value   Propping to the weakest members  
 
Panel A: Desciptive statistics full sample  Nb  Mean Standard Error Median
ROA        105 549,00    0,1392 0,1572 0,1140
ROE        105 549,00    0,0757 0,0859 0,0544
ROAf        105 549,00    0,1268 0,0358 0,1170
ROAg          67 360,00    0,1267 0,0340 0,1202
Size (Sales in K€)        105 549,00    6452 6136 4216
Age        105 549,00    21,67 14,52 19,00
Leverage (Financial debt/Equity)        105 549,00    3,4860 4,3815 2,0579
Sales Growth        105 549,00    0,1061 0,4279 0,0540
Panel B: Average financial variables on the period (1999-2007)
ROA          17 152,00    0,1366 0,1439 0,1139
ROE          17 152,00    0,0753 0,0770 0,0589
Size (Sales in K€)
Age          17 152,00    20,43 14,60 17,00
Leverage          17 152,00    3,8345 4,1345 2,4277
Sales Growth          17 152,00    0,1234 0,3226 0,0719
Panel C: Controlled firms control structure caracteristics
CF          13 657,00    76% 24% 85%
Control ratio          13 657,00    1,0254 0,1516 1,0000
Relative Position          17 152,00    1,3325 0,4633 1,0000
Panel D: Groups characteristics
Nbfirms          10 795,00    4,40 7,95 3,00
Level          10 795,00    2,23 0,52 2,00
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TABLE 3: Firms’ distance from control influence on their economic performance 






t i n n i t i Controls CS ROA ,
2
, , 1 , ε β β α + + + = ∑
=  
The explained variable is the annual ROA of the firm. CF is the cash flow rights of the controlling firm, Control 
Ratio is the ratio of control computed according to the weakest link method and the cash flow rights of the 
controlling firm, Controlling is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm is the business group controlling 
firm and 0 else, Ultimately Controlled  is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm does not control any 
other firm, Relative Position is the ratio of the number of level of control in the business group and the position 
of the firm, Size is the log of the firm annual turnover, Age is the log of firm age, Leverage is the ratio of firm 
debt on total liabilities, Growth is the firm annual turnover growth rate. Y 1999 to Y 2006 are year dummies 
where the year 2007 is the reference. The standard errors of estimates are reported in italics under the value of 
the estimated coefficients.  *** indicates that coefficients estimates are significant at the 1% level according to 
the student test, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CF -0,0269*** -0,0284***
0,0021 0,0020
Control Ratio 0,0182** 0,0207***
0,0034 0,0034
Controlling  -0,0305*** -0,0362***
0,0012 0,0012
Ultimately Controlled 0,0168*** 0,0176***
0,0010 0,0010
Relative Position -0,023*** -0,0260***
0,0011 0,0011
Size 0,0049*** 0,0066*** 0,0043*** 0,0060*** 0,0043*** 0,0060*** 0,0056*** 0,0074*** 0,0053*** 0,0072***
0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0006 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005
Age -0,0139*** -0,0237*** -0,0147*** -0,0245*** -0,0119*** -0,0214*** -0,0132*** -0,0229*** -0,0126*** -0,0222***
0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007
Leverage -0,0068*** -0,0068*** -0,0070*** -0,0068*** -0,0069***
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001
Growth -0,0041*** -0,0043*** -0,0039*** -0,0040*** -0,0038***
0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011
Y 1999 0,0129*** 0,0216*** 0,0126*** 0,0213*** 0,0129*** 0,0219*** 0,0134*** 0,0221*** 0,0134*** 0,0222***
0,0023 0,0022 0,0023 0,0022 0,0023 0,0022 0,0023 0,0022 0,0023 0,0022
Y 2000 0,0135*** 0,0219*** 0,0133*** 0,0216*** 0,0135*** 0,0221*** 0,0140*** 0,0223*** 0,0140*** 0,0225***
0,0022 0,0021 0,0022 0,0021 0,0022 0,0021 0,0022 0,0021 0,0022 0,0021
Y 2001 0,0150*** 0,0220*** 0,0148*** 0,0217*** 0,0150*** 0,0223*** 0,0154*** 0,0224*** 0,0154*** 0,0225***
0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021
Y 2002 0,0091*** 0,0140*** 0,0089*** 0,0138*** 0,0091*** 0,0142*** 0,0094*** 0,0144*** 0,0094*** 0,0145***
0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021
Y 2003 0,0012*** 0,0059*** 0,0010 0,0057*** 0,0012 0,0061*** 0,0016 0,0062*** 0,0016 0,0064***
0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021
Y 2004 0,0040*** 0,0073*** 0,0038* 0,0071*** 0,0040* 0,0074*** 0,0043** 0,0076*** 0,0043** 0,0077***
0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0020
Y 2005 -0,0043 -0,0020 -0,0044 -0,0021 -0,0043** -0,0020 -0,0041** -0,0018 -0,0041** -0,0018
0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0020
Y 2006 -0,0044 -0,0029 -0,0045 -0,0029 -0,0044** -0,0028 -0,0042** -0,0027 -0,0042** -0,0027
0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021
Intercept 0,1341*** 0,1731*** 0,1013*** 0,1369*** 0,1165*** 0,1552*** 0,0939*** 0,1309*** 0,1353*** 0,1757***
0,0053 0,0052 0,0063 0,0063 0,0052 0,0051 0,0054 0,0054 0,0052 0,0052
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 287,87 416,73 281,92 410,34 307,06 445,60 292,33 421,54 299,84 432,42
R2 0,0662 0,0996 0,065 0,0982 0,0703 0,1057 0,0672 0,1006 0,0688 0,1029
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TABLE 4: Firms’ distance from control influence on their average economic performance from 1999 to 
2007 










The explained variable is the average ROA of the firm over the period 1999 to 2007. CF is the cash flow rights 
of the controlling firm, Control Ratio is the ratio of control computed according to the weakest link method and 
the cash flow rights of the controlling firm, Controlling is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm is the 
business group controlling firm and 0 else, Ultimately Controlled  is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the 
firm does not control any other firm, Relative Position is the ratio of the number of level of control in the 
business group and the position of the firm, Size is the log of the firm annual turnover, Age is the log of firm 
age, Leverage is the ratio of firm debt on total liabilities, Growth is the firm annual turnover growth rate. The 
standard errors of estimates are reported in italics under the value of the estimated coefficients.  *** indicates 
that coefficients estimates are significant at the 1% level according to the student test, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 











Size 0,0021* 0,0022* 0,0021* 0,0035*** 0,0033***
0,0012 0,0012 0,0012 0,0012 0,0012
Age -0,0172*** -0,0173*** -0,0172*** -0,0189*** -0,0181***
0,0016 0,0016 0,0016 0,0016 0,0016
Leverage -0,0069*** -0,0069*** -0,0069*** -0,0066*** -0,0067***
0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003
Growth 0,0094*** 0,0094*** 0,0094*** 0,0086*** 0,0091***
0,0033 0,0033 0,0033 0,0033 0,0033
Intercept 0,1828*** 0,1466*** 0,1826*** 0,1588*** 0,2016***
0,0109 0,0113 0,0109 0,0115 0,0111
F 109,18 108,91 109,17 101,80 104,85
R2 0,1131 0,1128 0,1130 0,1062 0,1091
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TABLE 5: Firms’ distance from control influence on their financial performance 






t i n n i t i Controls CS ROE ,
2
, , 1 , ε β β α + + + = ∑
=  






t i n n t i i t i Controls ROA CS ROE ,
3
, , , 2 1 , ε β β β α + + + + = ∑
=  
The explained variable is the annual ROE of the firm. CF is the cash flow rights of the controlling firm, Control 
Ratio is the ratio of control computed according to the weakest link method and the cash flow rights of the 
controlling firm, Controlling is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm is the business group controlling 
firm and 0 else, Ultimately Controlled  is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm does not control any 
other firm, Relative Position is the ratio of the number of level of control in the business group and the position 
of the firm, ROA is the firm’s return on asset, Size is the log of the firm annual turnover, Age is the log of firm 
age, Leverage is the ratio of firm debt on total liabilities, Growth is the firm annual turnover growth rate. Y 1999 
to Y 2006 are year dummies where the year 2007 is the reference. The standard errors of estimates are reported 
in italics under the value of the estimated coefficients.  *** indicates that coefficients estimates are significant at 
the 1% level according to the student test, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CF -0,0065*** 0,0039***
0,0011 0,0008
Control Ratio 0,0124*** 0,0048***
0,0019 0,0014
Controlling  -0,0128*** 0,0005
0,0007 0,0005
Ultimately Controlled 0,0019*** -0,0045***
0,0005 0,0004
Relative Position -0,0053*** 0,0042***
0,0006 0,0004
ROA 0,3670*** 0,3667*** 0,3669*** 0,3675*** 0,3677***
0,0013 0,0013 0,0013 0,0013 0,0013
Size -0,0019*** -0,0021*** -0,0021*** -0,0019*** -0,0018*** -0,0044*** -0,0042*** -0,0043*** -0,0047*** -0,0045***
0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0002 0,0002 0,0002 0,0002 0,0002
Age -0,0112*** -0,0113*** -0,0103*** -0,0112*** -0,0109*** -0,0025*** -0,0024*** -0,0024*** -0,0028*** -0,0027***
0,0004 0,0004 0,0004 0,0004 0,0004 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003 0,0003
Leverage -0,0047*** -0,0047*** -0,0048*** -0,0047*** -0,0047*** -0,0022*** -0,0023*** -0,0022*** -0,0022*** -0,0022***
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Growth 0,0002 0,0001 0,0003 0,0002 0,0002 0,0017*** 0,0017*** 0,0017*** 0,0016*** 0,0016***
0,0006 0,0006 0,0006 0,0006 0,0006 0,0004 0,0004 0,0004 0,0004 0,0004
Y 1999 -0,0057*** -0,0058*** -0,0056*** -0,0057*** -0,0056*** -0,0137*** -0,0136*** -0,0136*** -0,0139*** -0,0138***
0,0012 0,0012 0,0012 0,0012 0,0012 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009
Y 2000 -0,0032*** -0,0032*** -0,0031*** -0,0032*** -0,0031*** -0,0112*** -0,0112*** -0,0112*** -0,0114*** -0,0114***
0,0012 0,0012 0,0012 0,0012 0,0012 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009
Y 2001 -0,0010 -0,0010 -0,0008 -0,0010 -0,0009 -0,0091*** -0,0090*** -0,0090*** -0,0092*** -0,0092***
0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008
Y 2002 -0,0024** -0,0024** -0,0023** -0,0024** -0,0023** -0,0076*** -0,0075*** -0,0075*** -0,0077*** -0,0077***
0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008
Y 2003 -0,0053*** -0,0053*** -0,0052*** -0,0053*** -0,0052*** -0,0074*** -0,0074*** -0,0074*** -0,0076*** -0,0075***
0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008
Y 2004 -0,0045*** -0,0045*** -0,0044*** -0,0045*** -0,0044*** -0,0072*** -0,0071*** -0,0071*** -0,0073*** -0,0072***
0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008
Y 2005 -0,0059*** -0,0059*** -0,0058*** -0,0059*** -0,0058*** -0,0051*** -0,0051*** -0,0051*** -0,0052*** -0,0052***
0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008
Y 2006 -0,0034*** -0,0034*** -0,0034*** -0,0034*** -0,0034*** -0,0024*** -0,0023*** -0,0024*** -0,0024*** -0,0024***
0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008 0,0008
Intercept 0,1367*** 0,1204*** 0,1322*** 0,1304*** 0,1370*** 0,0732*** 0,0702*** 0,0753*** 0,0823*** 0,0723***
0,0029 0,0034 0,0028 0,0029 0,0028 0,0021 0,0025 0,0021 0,0022 0,0021
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F 399,9500 400,3700 413,8200 399,0900 401,8900 3676,3700 3675,6200 3674,8300 3683,7000 3681,2700
R2 0,0959 0,0960 0,0989 0,0958 0,0964 0,5026 0,5025 0,5025 0,5031 0,5029
Number of Observations 105549 105549 105549 105549 105549 105549 105549 105549 105549 105549    32 
TABLE 6: Firms’ distance from control influence on their sensitivity to industry adjusted and group 
performance 
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The explained variable is the annual ROA of the firm. CF is the cash flow rights of the controlling firm, Control 
Ratio is the ratio of control computed according to the weakest link method and the cash flow rights of the 
controlling firm, Controlling is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm is the business group controlling 
firm and 0 else, Ultimately Controlled  is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm does not control any 
other firm, Relative Position is the ratio of the number of level of control in the business group and the position 
of the firm, ROAf is the firm's industry adjusted performance, ROAg is the group’s performance, Size is the log 
of the firm annual turnover, Age is the log of firm age, Leverage is the ratio of firm debt on total liabilities, 
Growth is the firm annual turnover growth rate. Y 1999 to Y 2006 are year dummies where the year 2007 is the 
reference. The * between two variables indicates the coefficient estimation of the interaction between the two 
variables, in column 1 to 5 the interaction is between firms’ distance from control  and firms’ adjusted 
performance, and in column 6 to 10 it is the interaction between firms’ distance from control  and group 
performance. The standard errors of estimates are reported in italics under the value of the estimated coefficients.  
*** indicates that coefficients estimates are significant at the 1% level according to the student test, ** at 5%, 
and * at 10%. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CF*ROAf/g -0,2917*** -0,3119***
0,0152 0,0192




Ultimately Controlled*ROAf/g 0,1480*** 0,1509***
0,0073 0,0093
Relative Position*ROAf/g -0,2148*** -0,24826***
0,0078 0,0103
ROAf 1,1200*** 0,7856*** 0,9978*** 0,8848*** 1,2476*** 0,7865*** 0,7944*** 0,7219*** 0,7878*** 0,7679***
0,0180 0,0299 0,0132 0,0137 0,0167 0,0236 0,0236 0,0235 0,0236 0,0236
ROAg 0,6925*** 0,2558*** 0,5443*** 0,3706*** 0,7943***
0,0299 0,0389 0,0254 0,0257 0,0294
Size 0,0051*** 0,0044*** 0,0039*** 0,0056*** 0,0051*** 0,0064*** 0,0055*** 0,0046*** 0,0070*** 0,0064***
0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007
Age -0,0234*** -0,0245*** -0,0215*** -0,0230*** -0,0224*** -0,0211*** -0,0222*** -0,0187*** -0,0205*** -0,0198***
0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009 0,0009
Leverage -0,0064*** -0,0064*** -0,0067*** -0,0064*** -0,0065*** -0,0061*** -0,0061*** -0,0065*** -0,0061*** -0,0062***
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001
Growth -0,0045*** -0,0048*** -0,0044*** -0,0044*** -0,0043*** -0,0062*** -0,0065*** -0,0061*** -0,0061*** -0,0058***
0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0014 0,0014 0,0014 0,0014 0,0014
Y 1999 0,0108*** 0,0103*** 0,0113*** 0,0109*** 0,0112*** 0,0035 0,0033 0,0021 0,0036 0,0034
0,0022 0,0022 0,0022 0,0022 0,0022 0,0030 0,0030 0,0030 0,0030 0,0030
Y 2000 0,0094*** 0,0090*** 0,0100*** 0,0096*** 0,0099*** 0,0015 0,0014 0,0008 0,0017 0,0017
0,0021 0,0022 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0029 0,0029 0,0028 0,0029 0,0029
Y 2001 0,0106*** 0,0103*** 0,0112*** 0,0107*** 0,0110*** 0,0048* 0,0047* 0,0046* 0,0048* 0,0049*
0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0028 0,0028 0,0028 0,0028 0,0028
Y 2002 0,0064*** 0,0061*** 0,0068*** 0,0066*** 0,0067*** 0,0019 0,0017 0,0017 0,0019 0,0020
0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027
Y 2003 0,0034 0,0031 0,0036* 0,0036* 0,0037* 0,0003 0,0001 0,0005 0,0004 0,0006
0,0021 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0021 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027
Y 2004 0,0055*** 0,0053*** 0,0057*** 0,0057*** 0,0059*** 0,0028 0,0026 0,0032 0,0028 0,0031
0,0020 0,0020 0,0020 0,0020 0,0020 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026
Y 2005 0,0024 0,0022 0,0024 0,0027 0,0027 0,0017 0,0015 0,0023 0,0017 0,0019
0,0021 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0020 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026
Y 2006 0,0030 0,0029 0,0030 0,0033 0,0033 0,0024 0,0022 0,0029 0,0024 0,0026
0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026
Intercept 0,0588*** 0,0677*** 0,0675*** 0,0517*** 0,0559*** 0,0115* 0,0218*** 0,0246*** 0,0027 0,0071
0,00514 0,00513 0,00510 0,00518 0,00513 0,0066 0,0066 0,0065 0,0067 0,0066
F 761,81 736,33 828,82 765,53 792,53 535,75 518,84 602,40 535,69 559,51
R2 0,0918 0,0890 0,0991 0,0922 0,0951 0,1066 0,1036 0,1183 0,1066 0,1108
Number of Observations 105549 105549 105549 105549 105549 67360 67360 67360 67360 67360    33 
TABLE 7: Firms’ distance from control influence on their sensitivity to industry adjusted and group 
performance 
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 The explained variable is the annual ROA of the firm.  CF is the cash flow rights of the controlling firm, Control 
Ratio is the ratio of control computed according to the weakest link method and the cash flow rights of the 
controlling firm, Controlling is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm is the business group controlling 
firm and 0 else, Ultimately Controlled  is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the firm does not control any 
other firm, Relative Position is the ratio of the number of level of control in the business group and the position 
of the firm, ROAf is the firm's industry adjusted performance, Size is the log of the firm annual turnover, Age is 
the log of firm age, Leverage is the ratio of firm debt on total liabilities, Growth is the firm annual turnover 
growth rate. Y 1999 to Y 2006 are year dummies where the year 2007 is the reference. CS*ROAf is the 
estimation of the interaction between the industry adjusted performance and the variable of distance from 
control, witch is also estimated as an independent variable. CS*ROAg is the estimation of the interaction 
between the group performance and the variable of distance from control, witch is also estimated as an 
independent variable. The standard errors of estimates are reported in italics under the value of the estimated 
coefficients.  *** indicates that coefficients estimates are significant at the 1% level according to the student test, 
** at 5%, and * at 10%. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CF 0,03414*** 0,0543***
0,0073 0,010
Control Ratio 0,0177 0,019
0,0126 0,015
Controlling  0,0148*** 0,0361***
0,0044 0,007
Ultimately Controlled 0,0042 0,004
0,0034 0,005
Relative Position -0,0025 0,0092*
0,0038 0,005
ROAf 1,4015*** 0,92066*** 1,0177*** 0,9016*** 1,2229*** 0,7841*** 0,7948*** 0,7130*** 0,7874*** 0,7667***
0,0465 0,1008 0,0144 0,0194 0,0406 0,024 0,024 0,024 0,024 0,024
CS* ROAf -0,5410*** 0,0430 -0,4208*** 0,1175*** -0,1965***
0,0552 0,0978 0,0338 0,0259 0,0287
ROAg 1,0116*** 0,4009*** 0,5882*** 0,3865*** 0,8846***
0,064 0,125 0,027 0,032 0,059
CS*ROAg -0,7115*** 0,033 -0,7102*** 0,1229*** -0,3161***
0,073 0,119 0,050 0,035 0,040
Size 0,0051*** 0,0044*** 0,0040*** 0,0056*** 0,0051*** 0,0063*** 0,0055*** 0,0047*** 0,0070*** 0,0064***
0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,0005 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
Age -0,0236*** -0,0245*** -0,0216*** -0,0229*** -0,0224*** -0,0212*** -0,0222*** -0,0189*** -0,0205*** -0,0199***
0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,0007 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001
Leverage -0,0064*** -0,0064*** -0,0067*** -0,0064*** -0,0065*** -0,0061*** -0,0061*** -0,0065*** -0,0061*** -0,0062***
0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,0001 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000
Growth -0,0045*** -0,0048*** -0,0044*** -0,0044*** -0,0042*** -0,0062*** -0,0065*** -0,0061*** -0,0061*** -0,0058***
0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0011 0,0014 0,0014 0,0196 0,0014 0,0014
Y 1999 0,0108*** 0,0103*** 0,0113*** 0,0110*** 0,0112*** 0,0035 0,0033 0,0022 0,0036 0,0034
0,0022 0,0022 0,0022 0,0022 0,0022 0,0030 0,0030 0,0030 0,0030 0,0030
Y 2000 0,0094*** 0,0090*** 0,0101*** 0,0096*** 0,0099*** 0,0016 0,0014 0,0010 0,0017 0,0017
0,0021 0,0022 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0029 0,0029 0,0028 0,0029 0,0029
Y 2001 0,0106*** 0,0103*** 0,0112*** 0,0108*** 0,0110*** 0,0030* 0,0047 0,0047* 0,0048* 0,0049*
0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0019 0,0028 0,0028 0,0028 0,0028
Y 2002 0,0064*** 0,0061*** 0,0068*** 0,0066*** 0,0068*** 0,0048 0,0017 0,0018 0,0019 0,0020
0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027
Y 2003 0,0034 0,0031 0,0036* 0,0036* 0,0037* 0,0003 0,0001 0,0005 0,0004 0,0006
0,0021 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0021 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027 0,0027
Y 2004 0,0055*** 0,0053*** 0,0057*** 0,0057*** 0,0059*** 0,0028 0,0026 0,0032 0,0028 0,0031
0,0020 0,0020 0,0020 0,0020 0,0020 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026
Y 2005 0,0024 0,0022 0,0024 0,0026 0,0027 0,0017 0,0015 0,0022 0,0017 0,0019
0,0021 0,0021 0,0020 0,0021 0,0020 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026
Y 2006 0,0030 0,0029 0,0030 0,0033 0,0033 0,0024 0,0022 0,0028 0,0024 0,0026
0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026 0,0026
Intercept 0,0314*** 0,0496*** 0,0644*** 0,0492*** 0,0592*** -0,0310*** 0,002 0,0066*** 0,000 -0,0048***
0,0078 0,0139 0,0052 0,0056 0,0072 0,010 0,017 0,001 0,007 0,009
F 712,64 687,38 774,41 714,59 739,72 504,52 486,51 566,90 502,25 524,75
R2 0,0920 0,0890 0,0992 0,0922 0,0951 0,107 0,104 0,119 0,107 0,111
Number of Observations 105549 105549 105549 105549 105549 67360 67360 67360 67360 67360  i 
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